Last Friday, hidden in the aftermath of the U.S. government’s decision to waive sanctions on Russia, was language proposing a joint U.S.-Russia project on data centers. As part of wider negotiations with the United States, Special Envoy to the Russian President Kirill Dmitriev suggested that a joint initiative between the two countries could focus on building data center infrastructure. Moreover, his statement suggested that several Russian companies were “actively participating” in the preliminary stages of these discussions.
Data centers are a delicate issue. Domestically, the rise in AI use is driving massive economic investment in data center development across the nation. Corresponding levels of opposition against data centers and AI remain high among the American public as the United States heads into midterm elections in November. Militarily, this proposal comes just as Ukraine conducted strikes against Russian data centers, disrupting services across Russia, and as President Zelensky vowed to continue targeting them, despite criticism from President Trump.
Most importantly, critical sectors across the U.S. economy and society depend upon data centers—which themselves hold sensitive data—making them vital national security and critical infrastructure assets. Collaboration with Russia in this sector poses severe risks to U.S. national security. Congress should act urgently to understand the proposal’s origin and substance before it becomes an irreversible reality.
Is This Proposal Feasible?
Little detail has been released about the proposed idea, locations, participating parties, or timelines. Its origins are also unclear: Is it a serious proposal by the Russian government? Or subtle retaliation at Ukraine’s recent targeting of Russian data centers? Or a means of keeping what some are branding as Russia-Ukraine “peace negotiation” channels open?
Its timing suggests the idea is very much in its infancy. Last week, President Trump waived new sanctions and tariffs on Russia that the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 would have imposed. President Trump noted that the issuance of the waiver was in the “national interests” of the United States. However, the waiver does not appear to impact preexisting sanctions for the technology sectorlevied against Russia beginning in 2022 by then-President Biden. Additionally, the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce have regulations listicting financial transactions and information technology services with Russia that limit U.S. companies from selling technology to Russia.
This makes it especially unclear as to how such a deal would work in practice, such as whether the Treasury and Commerce regulations would require different exemptions or thresholds in order for the United States to collaborate with Russia. It is also unclear whether new commercial incentives would be needed in order for U.S. private sector companies to participate—let alone to navigate the sanctions landscape. In the current regulatory and political environment, and absent further executive or agency intervention to ease these longstanding regulatory restrictions, the U.S. technology sector would take on significant risk working with Russia on developing data centers.
Although there is historical precedent for security cooperation between the United States and Russia, such as on counterterrorism during the early days of the Global War on Terror, these attempts at cooperation went rapidly downhill. Most importantly, cooperation fell apart following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. A relationship marred by historical and mutual distrustand a checkered history of cooperation, raises significant questions as to why cooperation on data centers would be possible with an adversary actively involved in war.
Serious Security Implications
Developing a data center with a hostile adversary of the United States would be a terrible move for national security. Russia views itself as being at war with the West, and the Kremlin sees the United States as its main enemy. It has skilled and well-resourced security and intelligence organsa large cyber web it can use to steal data from and disrupt Western systems, and a military and security apparatus pursuing a full-scale, illegal war on Ukraine and sabotage and destruction across Europe. The Russian government’s legal and extralegal architecture of repression enables its security services—especially the FSB, Russia’s Federal Security Service, which takes primacy at home—to compel or coerce cooperation from a wide range of Russian businesses, organizations, and individuals that do not advertise themselves as government-connected.
Russia’s domestic legal requirements for technology companies are onerousautocratic, and subject to politically driven changes and discriminatory enforcement on a whim. Any server that sat in Russia or had a business agreement with a Russian entity would immediately expose itself to potential Russian government data access and cyber exploitation. Moreover, the Russian government would never permit such a project to take place without the active involvement of the Russian security services. This renders mere U.S.-Russia calls and emails (on U.S. government systems or nongovernment devices) about the potential deal itself, not to mention any infrastructure that could be built or allocated as part of the stated idea, a significant counterintelligence and cybersecurity threat vector for the United States.
For this reason, functionally speaking, setting up a U.S.-Russia data center deal could likely lead to one of two scenarios, neither of which is good for the United States and its national security:
- A Hollow Pact: The first would be a scenario in which neither side trusts anything that would go into the data center, meaning neither side does anything of value with said infrastructure. The project would lack any clarity or clear sense of purpose, beyond to potentially create high-risk touchpoints between businesspeople in the United States and hostile actors in Russia. This would only serve to advance a Kremlin propaganda line about Russia as a place with which to do business.
- Asymmetric Risk: The second would be a scenario in which one or both countries—most likely the United States—put some data or software of note in said data center. Such a move would put all U.S. information, related technology, and related personnel at immediate risk of exploitation by the Russian security services. Again, the gains would be none, and the security risks to U.S. data, technology, people, and involved organizations would be enormous. Russia would again win in the propaganda sphere; it could position itself as a country with which one could do business, rather than an authoritarian state waging illegal war on Ukraine and not-so-covert, below-the-threshold conflict on the entirety of the West.
Implications for International Allies
All 27 European Union (EU) Member States formally expressed their regret last week at the U.S. decision to temporarily lift sanctions on Russian diesel imports. Moreover, the EU just imposed its largest-ever sanctions package against Russia for its sustained conflict against Ukraine. The proposal undermines these penalties and normalizes Russia’s aggression during active conflict, not to mention sending a message to other states—such as China—that aggression toward neighbors will be tolerated, undermining national sovereignty.
The proposal also poses severe implications for information sharing and data flows. Given that a joint U.S.-Russia data center would bridge two very different geographic and legal jurisdictions, one unintended consequence would be to push the United States’ close partners toward tighter restrictions on their data flows, storage, and greater sovereign architecture. There are also economic consequences: U.S. companies and organizations could face barriers and higher scrutiny operating internationally for fear of customer data being accessible to Russia.
The data center would also be considered a high-risk national security threat by close allies—particularly the Five Eyes, EU member states, and NATO. Even if the joint data center were solely for commercial or energy purposes, the national security risks would be beyond any acceptable risk tolerance. Under joint architecture with Russia, the potential for Russian espionage, cyberattacks, or data exfiltration would be ever-present. Though an extremely adverse consequence, it should come as no surprise if close U.S. allies decided to restrict intelligence sharing with the United States as a result.
Conclusion
The proposal remains in the early stages of discussion between the two governments. As that discussion continues, there needs to be significant scrutiny of the proposal. At a time when U.S. public sentiment is starkly against the building of new data centers in the United States, Congress can play a critical role. It should ask urgent questions of the Trump administration to understand why and how such a proposal should go ahead and whether it can be done safely. Additionally, lawmakers should summon U.S. tech and AI companies to clarify their equities in such a deal, and, most importantly, their preparedness efforts to protect U.S. data should the proposal become a reality.
Russia is an adversary of the United States and NATO. It is engaged in a persistent campaign of subversion and sabotage (and even assassination attempts) against the West, and it is actively involved in a conflict that runs counter to U.S. and NATO interests. A proposal to intermingle with Russia—at the core of the U.S. economy—risks endangering U.S. national security by whitewashing the proposal as part of a broader economic deal. By comparison, in a China-Taiwan conflict scenario, the United States would surely not strike a similar deal to build a data center with China. China is considered both a strategic competitor to the United States and a national security threat. A deal over a data center would legitimize China’s aggression, alienate allies, and signal a lack of U.S. strategic resolve. It would also invite a slew of national security risks from a state with a history of targeting U.S. critical sectors. So, why should the U.S.-Russia proposal be acceptable for U.S. interests? Data centers are a vital national security asset, not a bargaining chip to be used in negotiations with a long-term adversary of the United States.
Nikita Shah is a senior fellow in the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Justin Sherman is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program at CSIS.
Source: www.csis.org
