A blue wave rolled across the United States last night.
With results still filtering in, Democrats looked poised to win both chambers of the U.S. Congress — the Senate and the House — decisively.
It represents a sizable victory for the Democratic Party, but analysts don’t expect the shift in political winds to significantly alter Donald Trump’s foreign policy toward Ukraine and the rest of Europe.
Due to the relatively weak foreign policy powers of Congress and Trump’s embrace of executive power, even a Democratic-controlled Congress can only play a marginal role in shifting Trump’s approach.
Until America’s 2028 presidential election, Trump will continue to call the shots, such as by putting additional pressure on Ukraine to take a peace deal with Russia, and the possible use of new tariffs powers against the European Union.
“The Trump administration’s foreign policy is like a car going down the highway,” said James Green, a research fellow at the Center for European Reform and former Congressional aide in Washington. “Congress has the ability to slow that car down, maybe make it put on a turn signal, but it’s going to be very difficult for Congress to change the overall route over the next two years.”
Congress’s waning foreign policy power
With control of both chambers, the Democratic Party now holds Congress’ constitutionally granted foreign policy powers, such as declaring war, appropriating funds for the military, confirming nominations, regulating foreign commerce and overseeing the executive branch.
However, since the Vietnam War, Congress has handed over a large number of its foreign policy powers to the executive, according to Nevada Joan Lee, a policy fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations.
“You see consistently when something arises, Congress deferring to the presidency to make a foreign policy decision,” she said.
Congress still has some tools to shape American foreign policy, but they’ve been blunted in recent years.
For example, Congress controls key legislative files that must pass each year for the government to function — such as the National Defense Authorization Act that sets troop levels in Europe or reconciliation bills to fund the government. However, Trump has repeatedly refused to use the spending authorized by Congress, a process called pocket recissions, according to Joan Lee.
That means if the Congress wanted to restore funding to Ukraine, Trump may simply choose to not spend the money, she said.
Another tool at Congress’ disposal is threatening a government shutdown over spending bills. However, because foreign policy carries little weight in American domestic politics, it’s unlikely Democrats would risk a shutdown to restore funding to Ukraine, for example. A shutdown is far more likely over an issue like healthcare.
Congress also holds oversight authority over the executive branch and could summon members of Trump’s foreign policy team for hearings. However, Trump has claimed executive privilege on a widening array of his decision-making powers, making it more difficult for Congress to call in members of his administration.
“I don’t think the midterms will dramatically shape Trump’s policy toward Europe one way or another,” said Peter Rough, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank in Washington D.C.
Juraj Majcin, a policy analyst at the European Policy Centre, said that a poor showing by the Republicans could “frustrate” Trump and “prompt him to double down on efforts to restrict U.S. support for Ukraine.”
Graham Sanctions Act could be used against Europe
In fact, in some key areas of foreign policy Congress may have handed the Trump administration additional tools that could lead to more pressure on Ukraine and Europe.
In September, Congress passed the Graham Act to impose significant sanctions on Russia and countries buying Russian oil. But last month, Trump deferred the sanctions on Russia in exchange for a diesel deal with Putin.
The legislation also grants the White House additional tariff power, including against countries that continue to import Russian oil — potentially giving Trump a potent, legally sound weapon against European countries still buying Russian fuel, according to Joan Lee.
“This pretty much opens up any EU country to attack from the president on these tariffs,” she said. “It took a lot of power out of Congress’s hands.”
MEP Bernd Lange (S&D, DE) said that a Democratic victory “could lead to more confrontational decisions, especially on trade and tariffs” from Trump. “A lame duck could become an angry duck,” he added.
Looking beyond the U.S. midterms
The next big shift in U.S. foreign policy toward Europe and Ukraine won’t come until 2028, when the next American presidential elections will be held, according to Green.
Members states and the EU need to start engaging now with incoming members of Congress and 2028 presidential candidates on both the Democratic and Republican side, to begin shaping how those candidates view Europe — and what the transatlantic relationship could look like post-Trump, said Green and Joan Lee.
The progressive left-wing of the Democratic Party should be of special concern, according to Joan Lee. She said that conversations with progressive aides in the Democratic Party revealed an eagerness to anchor a possible transatlantic relationship under a more progressive administration in industrial policy, tech regulation and climate change — rather than on security.
That could mean a possible progressive president would hesitate to increase troop levels in Europe, according to Joan Lee.
However, for all the importance the U.S. plays in the EU and Ukraine, the continent’s troubles have remained relatively marginal in U.S. politics.
“The biggest risk that Europeans risk with the Democratic Party is falling into some sort of irrelevance,” said Joan Lee.
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Source: www.theparliamentmagazine.eu
