Trump’s midterm setback gives India more reason to hedge its bets

The Democrats’ capture of both chambers of Congress in the 2026 midterms has dealt Donald Trump a political blow at home and added a layer of uncertainty to American foreign policy. Trump retains considerable room to manoeuvre abroad, but a Congress led by the opposition can subject his decisions to greater scrutiny. That tension comes at a difficult moment for Washington, with the United States deeply involved in the war with Iran, global energy markets under pressure and ties with traditional allies already strained.

For New Delhi, the question is how to read a Washington where the president has lost political ground but still commands a powerful office. With less room to manoeuvre on Capitol Hill, Trump may have more reason to seize the initiative abroad. Iran is the immediate test. Republican hawks will press him to escalate, even as Democratic lawmakers seek greater scrutiny of the war.

From Hormuz to the Indo-Pacific

The Strait of Hormuz is where Washington’s post-midterm uncertainty could have its most immediate consequences abroad. The US has reinforced its military presence in West Asia, with reports pointing to the possibility of three carrier strike groups operating in US Central Command’s area of responsibility. That gives Trump more military options. It also raises the risk that a miscalculation at sea could widen the war.

Trump could use the build-up to press Tehran for concessions or order another round of air strikes to bring the war to a close. The political pressure to end the conflict can cut both ways. It can strengthen the case for a deal, but it can also sharpen the temptation to force an outcome through military action. Much will depend on how Tehran reads the build-up and whether it sees room to bargain before Washington decides to strike.

The Strait of Hormuz is where a war in West Asia becomes an economic problem for Asia. According to the US Energy Information Administration, about 20 million barrels of oil a day passed through the strait in 2025. Around 80 per cent of the crude oil and condensate went to Asian markets, with China, India, Japan and South Korea among the principal buyers. A prolonged disruption would also squeeze supplies of liquefied natural gas from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

For India, which imports nearly 89 per cent of its crude oil requirements, even a partial disruption can carry a steep price. Higher war-risk insurance premiums and freight rates can raise the cost of cargoes that still get through. A sustained rise in energy prices could fuel inflation, widen the current account deficit and put pressure on the rupee.

The consequences of the war extend to the Indo-Pacific. A prolonged military commitment in West Asia could stretch the forces and attention Washington can devote to the region. Beijing will watch whether the United States can sustain its commitments in both theatres.

What Can Congress Change?

Democratic lawmakers can use hearings to press the administration on the aims and costs of the Iran war and scrutinise its trade and regulatory decisions. They can also seek funding conditions and statutory limits. Turning that leverage into binding constraints on an ongoing military operation is harder than making the White House defend its course. As commander-in-chief, Trump retains considerable latitude over the use of American military power.

Foreign assistance gives lawmakers a more direct opening through appropriations. Democratic leaders have signalled an interest in rebuilding parts of the US foreign assistance apparatus dismantled under Trump. Congress can seek to restore funding for selected programmes and use oversight to track how that money is spent. The choice of what to fund will shape which disrupted partnerships have a chance to recover.

For think tanks, universities and civil society organisations in India, Africa and Southeast Asia, renewed US support could help restart research programmes and revive partnerships disrupted by the USAID cuts. It could also open avenues for collaboration on governance, development, climate resilience, maritime security and capacity building.

The test comes after appropriation. How much of that support reaches partners will depend on which programmes the administration prioritises and how quickly agencies can award grants and disburse funds. For institutions whose programmes were interrupted, the timing and continuity of funding will determine whether they can rebuild those programmes and sustain collaboration.

India’s Choices in a Divided Washington

A Democratic Congress offers New Delhi little reason to expect a less protectionist Washington. US strategic priorities and domestic pressures, including industrial competition, will continue to shape Washington’s approach. Trump can still use tariffs and sanctions or pursue bilateral deals through executive channels. For India, the risk is that Washington leans harder on tariffs just as disputes over Russia and energy complicate negotiations that also bear on technology and strategic cooperation.

India should pursue a trade agreement with the United States that both sides can implement and deepen defence technology cooperation where it builds Indian capabilities. India has sourced oil from Russia, the Gulf, Africa and the Americas. New Delhi needs to build on that diversity and expand its strategic petroleum reserves to buy time when shipments are disrupted. New Delhi has reason to deepen maritime cooperation with Japan, Australia and ASEAN partners, and to work with them and with Europe on defence manufacturing, critical technologies and secure supply chains. The aim is to build capabilities India can draw on even when Washington’s attention is divided. India also has reason to keep diplomatic channels open with rival powers while working with Washington where interests converge.

As Congress and the White House contest the direction of American foreign policy, New Delhi will need to judge where Washington can follow through on its commitments. For India, the value of multi-alignment lies in the choices it keeps open. That is what gives strategic autonomy practical meaning when the balance of power in Washington shifts.

(Monish Tourangbam is a Fellow and Purushendra Singh is a Senior Research Consultant at the Chintan Research Foundation (CRF), New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)